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Standards, Environments, and Macros                       rbac(5)



NAME
     rbac - role-based access control

DESCRIPTION
     The addition of role-based  access  control  (RBAC)  to  the
     Solaris operating environment gives developers the opportun-
     ity to deliver fine-grained security  in  new  and  modified
     applications.  RBAC  is an alternative to the all-or-nothing
     security model of traditional superuser-based systems.  With
     RBAC,  an  administrator  can assign privileged functions to
     specific user accounts (or special accounts called roles).

     There are two ways to give applications privileges:

     1. Administrators can  assign  special  attributes  such  as
        setUID to application binaries (executable files).

     2. Administrators can  assign  special  attributes  such  as
        setUID to applications using execution profiles.

     Special attribute assignment along with  the  theory  behind
     RBAC  is  discussed in detail in "Role Based Access Control"
     chapter of the System Administration  Guide:  Security  Ser-
     vices.  This  chapter  describes what authorizations are and
     how to code for them.

  Authorizations
     An authorization is a unique string that represents a user's
     right  to  perform  some  operation  or class of operations.
     Authorization definitions are stored in  a  database  called
     auth_attr(4). For programming authorization checks, only the
     authorization name is significant.

     Some typical values  in  an  auth_attr  database  are  shown
     below.

     solaris.jobs.:::Cron and At Jobs::help=JobHeader.html
     solaris.jobs.grant:::Delegate Cron & At Administration::help=JobsGrant.html
     solaris.jobs.admin:::Manage All Jobs::help=AuthJobsAdmin.html
     solaris.jobs.user:::Cron & At User::help=JobsUser.html

     Authorization name strings ending with the grant suffix  are
     special  authorizations  that  give  a  user  the ability to
     delegate authorizations with the same prefix and  functional
     area to other users.

  Creating Authorization Checks
     To check authorizations, use the chkauthattr(3SECDB) library
     function,  which  verifies whether or not a user has a given
     authorization. The synopsis is:





SunOS 5.9           Last change: 15 Jul 2003                    1






Standards, Environments, and Macros                       rbac(5)



     int chkauthattr(const char *authname, const char *username);

     The  chkauthattr()  function  checks   the   policy.conf(4),
     user_attr(4),  and  prof_attr(4)  databases  in  order for a
     match to the given authorization.

     If you are modifying existing code that tests for root  UID,
     you should find the test in the code and replace it with the
     chkauthattr() function. A typical root UID check is shown in
     the first code segment below. An authorization check replac-
     ing it is shown in the second  code  segment;  it  uses  the
     solaris.jobs.admin   authorization  and  a  variable  called
     real_login representing the user.

     Example 1: Standard root check

     ruid = getuid();

     if ((eflag || lflag || rflag) && argc == 1) {
             if ((pwp = getpwnam(*argv)) == NULL)
                     crabort(INVALIDUSER);

             if (ruid != 0) {
                     if (pwp->pw_uid != ruid)
                             crabort(NOTROOT);
                     else
                             pp = getuser(ruid);
             } else
                     pp = *argv++;
     } else {

     Example 2: Authorization check

     ruid = getuid();
     if ((pwp = getpwuid(ruid)) == NULL)
             crabort(INVALIDUSER);

     strcpy(real_login, pwp->pw_name);

     if ((eflag || lflag || rflag) && argc == 1) {
             if ((pwp = getpwnam(*argv)) == NULL)
                     crabort(INVALIDUSER);

             if (!chkauthattr("solaris.jobs.admin", real_login)) {
                     if (pwp->pw_uid != ruid)
                             crabort(NOTROOT);
                     else
                             pp = getuser(ruid);
             } else
                     pp = *argv++;
     } else {




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Standards, Environments, and Macros                       rbac(5)



     For new applications, find an appropriate location  for  the
     test  and  use  chkauthattr()  as shown above. Typically the
     authorization check makes an access decision  based  on  the
     identity  of  the  calling user to determine if a privileged
     action (for example, a  system  call)  should  be  taken  on
     behalf of that user.

     Applications that perform a test to restrict who can perform
     their  security-relevant  functionality are generally setuid
     to root. Programs that were written prior to RBAC  and  that
     are  only  available  to  the  root  user  may not have such
     checks. In most cases, the kernel requires an effective user
     ID  of  root  to  override  policy  enforcement.  Therefore,
     authorization checking is most useful in programs  that  are
     setuid to root.

     For instance, if you want to write  a  program  that  allows
     authorized users to set the system date, the command must be
     run with an effective user ID of root. Typically, this means
     that  the  file  modes for the file would be -rwsr-xr-x with
     root ownership.

     Use caution, though, when making programs  setuid  to  root.
     For example, the effective UID should be set to the real UID
     as early as possible in the program's  initialization  func-
     tion.  The  effective UID can then be set back to root after
     the authorization check is performed and before  the  system
     call  is made. On return from the system call, the effective
     UID should be set back to the real UID again  to  adhere  to
     the principle of least privilege.

     Another consideration is that LD_LIBRARY path is ignored for
     setuid  programs  (see  SECURITY  section in ld.so.1(1)) and
     that shell scripts must be modified to  work  properly  when
     the  effective and real UIDs are different. For example, the
     -p flag in Bourne shell is required to avoid  resetting  the
     effective UID back to the real UID.

     Using an effective UID of  root  instead  of  the  real  UID
     requires extra care when writing shell scripts. For example,
     many shell scripts check to see if the user is  root  before
     executing   their  functionality.  With  RBAC,  these  shell
     scripts may be running with the effective UID  of  root  and
     with  a  real  UID of a user or role. Thus, the shell script
     should check euid instead of uid. For example,

     WHO=`id | cut -f1 -d" "`
     if [ ! "$WHO" = "uid=0(root)" ]
     then
            echo "$PROG: ERROR: you must be super-user to run this script."
            exit 1
     fi



SunOS 5.9           Last change: 15 Jul 2003                    3






Standards, Environments, and Macros                       rbac(5)



     should be changed to

     WHO=`/usr/xpg4/bin/id -n -u`
     if [ ! "$WHO" = "root" ]
     then
            echo "$PROG: ERROR: you are not authorized to run this script."
            exit 1
     fi

     Authorizations can be explicitly checked in shell scripts by
     checking the output of the auths(1) utility. For example,

     for auth in `auths | tr , " "` NOTFOUND
     do
         [ "$auth" = "solaris.date" ] && break       # authorization found
     done

     if [ "$auth" != "solaris.date" ]
     then
         echo >&2 "$PROG: ERROR: you are not authorized to set the date"
         exit 1
     fi

SEE ALSO
     ld.so.1(1),        chkauthattr(3SECDB),        auth_attr(4),
     policy.conf(4), prof_attr(4), user_attr(4)

     System Administration Guide: Security Services



























SunOS 5.9           Last change: 15 Jul 2003                    4