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MAC_TEST(4)              BSD Kernel Interfaces Manual              MAC_TEST(4)

NAME
     mac_test -- MAC framework testing policy

SYNOPSIS
     To compile the testing policy into your kernel, place the following lines
     in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC
           options MAC_TEST

     Alternately, to load the testing module at boot time, place the following
     line in your kernel configuration file:

           options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

           mac_test_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_test policy module implements a testing facility for the MAC
     framework.  Among other things, mac_test will try to catch corrupt labels
     the system is attempting to destroy and drop to the debugger.  Addition-
     ally, a set of statistics regarding the number of times various MAC
     framework entry points have been called is stored in the
     security.mac.test sysctl(8) tree.

   Label Format
     No labels are defined for mac_test.

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_mls(4), mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_test policy module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was devel-
     oped by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
     ciates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     See mac(9) concerning appropriateness for production use.  The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

BSD                            December 1, 2002                            BSD