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IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID(3)       Library Functions Manual       IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID(3)

       ipsec keyblobtoid, splitkeytoid - generate key IDs from RSA keys

       #include <&lt;freeswan.h>&gt;

       size_t keyblobtoid(const unsigned char *blob,
           size_t bloblen, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
       size_t splitkeytoid(const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
           const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, char *dst,
           size_t dstlen);

       Keyblobtoid and splitkeytoid generate key IDs from RSA keys, for use in
       messages and reporting, writing the result to dst.  A key ID is a short
       ASCII  string  identifying  a  key; currently it is just the first nine
       characters of the base64 encoding of the RFC  2537/3110  ``byte  blob''
       representation of the key.  (Beware that no finite key ID can be colli-
       sion-proof: there is always some small chance of two random keys having
       the same ID.)

       Keyblobtoid  generates a key ID from a key which is already in the form
       of an RFC 2537/3110 binary key blob (encoded exponent length, exponent,

       Splitkeytoid generates a key ID from a key given in the form of a sepa-
       rate (binary) exponent e and modulus m.

       The dstlen parameter of either specifies the size of the dst parameter;
       under  no  circumstances  are more than dstlen bytes written to dst.  A
       result which will not fit is truncated.  Dstlen can be zero,  in  which
       case  dst  need  not  be valid and no result is written, but the return
       value is unaffected; in  all  other  cases,  the  (possibly  truncated)
       result  is  NUL-terminated.   The freeswan.h header file defines a con-
       stant KEYID_BUF which is the size of a buffer large enough  for  worst-
       case results.

       Both  functions return 0 for a failure, and otherwise always return the
       size of buffer which would be needed to accommodate the full conversion
       result, including terminating NUL; it is the caller's responsibility to
       check this against the size of the provided buffer to determine whether
       truncation has occurred.

       With  keys generated by ipsec_rsasigkey(3), the first two base64 digits
       are always the same, and the third carries only about one bit of infor-
       mation.   It's  worse  with keys using longer fixed exponents, e.g. the
       24-bit exponent that's common in X.509  certificates.   However,  being
       able  to  relate key IDs to the full base64 text form of keys by eye is
       sufficiently useful that this waste of space  seems  justifiable.   The
       choice  of  nine digits is a compromise between bulk and probability of

       RFC 3110, RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System  (DNS),
       Eastlake, 2001 (superseding the older but better-known RFC 2537).

       Fatal  errors  are:  key too short to supply enough bits to construct a
       complete key ID (almost certainly indicating a garbage  key);  exponent
       too long for its length to be representable.

       Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer.

                                 25 March 2002            IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID(3)